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A thin volume, just under 100 pages, Érik Bordeleau’s Foucault Anonymat is a real essay in 
the classical sense of the term. It does not systematically contextualize Foucault’s account of 
anonymity within the history of philosophy. In fact, it does not offer a comprehensive ac-
count of anonymity in Foucault’s corpus at all, although it does move more or less chrono-
logically across his work. Instead, Bordeleau’s Foucault Anonymat, is a wide-ranging explo-
ration of a single, rich concept in relationship to a similarly multi-faceted thinker. But this is 
not all. In the spirit of Foucault, the book aims to serve as a lancet, a Molotov cocktail, or a 
siege tunnel,1 to unlock the potential of Foucauldian anonymity and detonate it beneath 
some of our most sacred categories: politics and identity, ethics and voice. Bordeleau thus 
turns the essay genre into a tool of resistance against today’s sectarian, identitarian politics, 
which—in his estimation—is drained of any real space for collective action.  
In this vein, Bordeleau proceeds with five chapters or five points of attack. Chapter 
1, “L’art de vivre, c’est de tuer la psychologie,” is a quick pass through the contemporary 
cultural landscape of anonymity. From the Zapatistas and Occupy to Anonymous and Le-
gion, the Biblical demon, Bordeleau considers the nature and possibilities of anonymity. 
Each instance, for Bordeleau, signifies the political force of an unknown quantity. It is not 
merely collective practice that marks their resistance but, more fundamentally, collective 
anonymity. This must be truer of resistance today, he suggests, than of any era before:  
 
To the degree that our epoch […] is dominated by a government of individualization that 
threatens and impoverishes our experience of community, wouldn’t we have to look for the 
springboard of [Foucault’s] analyses of modes of subjectification—if these are really an-
chored in practices of resistance—in some kind of experience of the impersonal and the 
anonymous? (27).  
 
Foucault knew the power of collective resistance quite well. For him, it did not merely hold 
political promise, but comprised the ethical mode of life. Thus, when he writes, “the art of 
living is the art of killing psychology, of creating with oneself and with others unnamed 
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individualities, beings, relations, and qualities,”2 he underscores not only the relational but 
the anonymous character of practices of the self.  
Up until this point, Bordeleau contends, scholars have not adequately understood or 
appreciated Foucault’s call to anonymity. This failure is the result of a widespread en-
dorsement of identity politics, so well championed, he says, by queer theory and multicul-
turalism in the US. According to Bordeleau, the likes of Judith Butler and Rey Chow have 
stymied our reading of Foucault, making us “lose sight of the problems of attachment to 
identity” (31) and keeping us from “getting free” of it (32). While I understand Bordeleau’s 
rejection of sectarianism, particularly in light of his commitment to activism through collec-
tive anonymity, his claim here fails to account for the anti-essentialist ways in which queer 
and critical race theorists have conceptualized identity and self-transformation, let alone 
coalition building and collective action. But it also appears insensitive to the fact that Fou-
cault’s own social identities, as the nodal points of institutionalized forces, intimately in-
formed his thinking of anonymity. On the one hand, as a white French male, social ano-
nymity was more feasible and freeing for Foucault than for someone from a highly visible 
and yet unacknowledged population. On the other hand, as a homosexual and an intellec-
tual, anonymity—and its companion invisibility—was something he found as desirable as it 
was impossible. Theorizing any concept from a Foucauldian perspective, I would argue, 
requires identifying the social positions that make a resistant practice like anonymity think-
able—and which make it less so.  
Having surveyed the field, Bordeleau moves in Chapter 2, “L’anonymat comme cri-
tique de l’intériorité privée,” to trace anonymity back into the early years of Foucault’s 
work. As one might expect, Bordeleau begins with Foucault’s intellectual fascination with 
theorists and writers of the limit experience, for whom language became a medium of self-
dissolution. Drawing on Nietzsche (46), Bataille (37), Blanchot, and Mallarmé (43), Foucault 
develops an account of the subject as a social production,3 one that can, especially through 
the experience of language, be ruptured and dissolve into radical anonymity:  
 
The experimentum linguae, the experience of language as such, threatens the speaking subject: 
it dissolves its apparent unity and weakens the evidence of an absolute interiority into which 
the subject could withdraw. Conversely, the being of language appears in itself only through 
the disappearance of the subject (44). 
 
It is at this point that Bordeleau I think helpfully develops a triumvirate of anonymities 
across Foucault’s three periods. Before there is ever an experiential anonymity (engaged as 
an ethos, a form of life) or a strategic anonymity (engaged as a tactic of resistance) (19), there 
is an ecstatic anonymity. Ecstatic anonymity “implies a release from the henceforth obsolete 
                                                                
2 Michel Foucault, “Conversation avec Werner Schroeter” [1982], Dits et Ecrits II (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 
no. 308, 1075. 
3 Michel Foucault, “Par-delà le bien et le mal” [1971], Dits et Ecrits I, no. 98, 1094. 
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form of personal interiority, one that ultimately makes oneself available to new possibilities 
of existence and being-in-community” (42). 
Turning from the ecstatic to the strategic in Chapter 3, “Murmure et combat,” Bor-
deleau asserts that Foucault’s desire for depersonalization through writing is, according to 
his own testimony, also a desire to join in collective struggle. As Foucault famously put it in 
The Archeology of Knowledge and “The Discourse on Language,” he writes “‘in order to have 
no face’” (50) and he speaks hoping that “‘speech would proceed from me, while I stood in 
its path—a slender gap—the point of its possible disappearance’” (52). Such statements ap-
pear to espouse one individual’s self-effacement in language and no more. But Foucault 
also asserts, in “Sur la sellette,” that “‘writing interests me only to the degree that it be-
comes part of the reality of a struggle’” (57). According to Bordeleau, all three testaments 
are consonant because the very structure of being lost in language mirrors that of being lost 
in collective action. For Bordeleau, this is borne out in the anti-documentary Get Rid of Your-
self, a self-described “encounter with emerging non-instituted or identity-less forms of pro-
test that refuse the representational politics of the official Left.”4 At one point, the film 
states: “You go. You are lost. […] You go, with no idea of who you are. […] Go follow the 
paths. If you were not so lost, you’d have no destiny for encounters.”5 Bordeleau reads sen-
timents like these as echoes of Foucault’s remarks before the Collège de France. While I am 
intrigued by this reading and sympathetic to interpretations that resist periodization, more 
work needs to be done to connect language and politics, literature and activism, individual 
and collective anonymity.  
While nascent in his early work, anonymity’s potential as a technique of struggle be-
comes actualized in Foucault’s activism of the 1970’s. As Bordeleau states in Chapter 4, “Ré-
sister en personne,” Foucault “turns his attention from literary issues to practices of politi-
cal resistance properly so-called. This evolution coincides in great part with his engagement 
in the GIP, Le Groupe d’information sur les prisons” (67). The GIP aimed to agitate the pub-
lic around prison issues by gathering and disseminating information from prisoners. Unit-
ing incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people, their families, as well as intellectuals 
and professionals on the outside, the GIP produced flyers, pamphlets, and reports written 
collectively and anonymously. Citing Beckett, Bordeleau suggests it did not matter who 
was speaking but rather that speech occurred, that word got out, that prison became a prob-
lem (86). On this basis, he makes the intriguing claim that Foucauldian re-sistance is best 
understood as con-sistance (72). It requires collective action and anonymity, through which 
individuals are submerged into multiplicitous forces.  
If the GIP really signals Foucault’s own politicization of anonymity, and I would 
agree with Bordeleau that this is arguably the case, then it deserves greater attention than 
the text affords. While it is quite true that the GIP deployed anonymity as a tactic of re-
sistance, the landscape here is more complicated. First, it really mattered who was speak-
                                                                
4 “Get Rid of Yourself”, Bernadette Corporation, 2003.  
http://www.bernadettecorporation.com/getrid.htm. Accessed April 24, 2015. 
5 Ibid. 
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ing. The GIP aimed to amplify the voices of prisoners, as those least acknowledged and yet 
most affected by the prison system. Second, the GIP also utilized the names of its public 
intellectuals to protect others involved and to mask the size of the group itself. They report: 
 
It was understood that three people, with some notoriety, would be put in the spotlight—
people who had to employ a certain etiquette and hide how things happened, hiding above 
all the fact that there was nothing to hide, that there was no organization. It was crucial that 
the penitentiary administration not even know whether or not there was organization.6  
 
The GIP’s use of collective anonymity therefore existed in a much larger context where 
prisoners’ voices were privileged and the attribution of a name could be as revolutionary as 
the lack of a name. If indeed Foucault’s politics of anonymity was forged in the fires of the 
GIP, it cannot be divorced from the politics of naming. Bordeleau would do well to balance 
his endorsement of anonymity accordingly. 
Foucault Anonymat draws to a close in Chapter 5, “Acérer la vie: la question du frot-
tement.” Bordeleau states that his ultimate goal throughout the text was to demonstrate 
“that the question of anonymity in Foucault consists not in pitting anonymity against iden-
tity, requiring us to simply do away with names and naming, so much as in problematizing 
the processes of subjectivation that stem from our relationships to dispositifs” (93). For Bor-
deleau, the Foucauldian call to anonymity is never simply to disappear, wander off, or opt 
out. Nor is it merely the summons to lose ourselves in the abyss of language or to renounce 
our name and join the resistance. It is, instead, the invitation to a sustained life of anonymi-
ty, one that consistently “guarantee[s] the possibility of friction” (99). Such a life works at 
every turn to resist the forces that confine and over-determine us in a biopolitical, neoliberal 
age. As such, it must counter the gravitational force of homo economicus at the individual 
and collective level. From this perspective, each form of anonymity—ecstatic, strategic, and 
experiential—requires the other and all forms are equally political, elements in a greater 
struggle. Foucault’s early dabbling in linguistic ecstasy, his late endorsement of ethical de-
personalization, and his political activism really must be interpreted alongside one another 
(85). And Foucault Anonymat does just that. 
 In the preface to The Use of Pleasure, Foucault speaks of the essay as a platform 
through which one might get free of oneself (91). Bordeleau’s essay, Foucault Anonymat, cer-
tainly permits the concept of Foucauldian anonymity to get free of its own stereotype as a 
cheap self-renunciation. Nevertheless, the essay maintains Foucault as an authorial anchor 
for the investigation. This means the text is a bit at war with its own impetus. On the one 
hand, it does not quite slip out from beneath Foucault’s shadow, although it employs rich 
cultural and theoretical references beyond him. On the other hand, it does not offer a full 
treatment of the concept of anonymity in Foucault’s work. At its best, Foucault Anonymat is 
a provocation, a gauntlet. Leveled at scholars and students, activists and theorists alike, it 
                                                                
6 François Colcombet, Antoine Lazarus, and Louis Appert, “Luttes autour des prisons” [1979], Dits et 
Écrits II, no. 273, 810. These three people of “some notoriety” were likely Jean-Marie Domenach, Michel 
Foucault, and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, who assumed leadership of the GIP at its inception. 
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assaults us with questions. What are the resources in queer and critical race theory to con-
ceptualize collective anonymity? Where does the similarity between the structure of linguis-
tic and political anonymity break down? What more might the GIP do to reframe our un-
derstanding of Foucauldian anonymity? Is anonymity really up to the task of resisting ne-
oliberalism? And for whom will it most matter? If Bordeleau provokes, he provokes at least 
another text and more attention to this undoubtedly important but still under-theorized 
strand in Foucault’s ethics, political activity, and literary experience. 
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